Doctrinal development United States Army Air Corps

1 doctrinal development

1.1 strategic bombardment in roles , missions
1.2 technological advances in bombers
1.3 general staff resistance air corps doctrine
1.4 ghq air force

doctrinal development
strategic bombardment in roles , missions

in march 1928, commenting on lack of survivability in combat of unit s keystone lb-7 , martin nbs-1 bombers, lt. col. hugh j. knerr, commander of 2nd bombardment group @ langley field, virginia, recommended air corps adopt 2 types of all-metal monoplane bombers, short-range day bomber , long-range night bomber. instructors @ air corps tactical school (acts), @ langley, took concept 1 step further in march 1930 recommending types instead light , heavy, latter capable of long range carrying heavy bomb load used during daylight.

the air corps in january 1931 got foot in door developing mission have capability, while @ same time creating need technological advancement of equipment. chief of naval operations admiral william v. pratt desirous of having general assent proposition naval aviation including land-based aircraft definition tied carrier-based fleet operations. pratt reached agreement new army chief of staff douglas macarthur air corps assume responsibility coastal defense (traditionally primary function of army secondary, war-time function of navy) beyond range of army s coast artillery guns, ending navy s apparent duplication of effort in coastal air operations. agreement, intended modification of joint action statement on coastal defense issued in 1926, not endorsed joint army-navy board , never had authority other personal agreement between 2 heads of service. though navy repudiated statement when pratt retired in 1934, air corps clung mission, , provided basis development of long-range bombers , creating new doctrine employ them.

the formulation of theories of strategic bombing gave new impetus argument independent air force. strategic or long-range bombardment intended destroy enemy nation s industry , war-making potential, , independent service have free hand so. despite perceived obstruction war department, of attributable shortage of funds, air corps made great strides during 1930s. doctrine emerged stressed precision bombing of industrial targets heavily armed long-range aircraft.

this doctrine resulted because of several factors. air corps tactical school moved in july 1931 maxwell field, alabama, taught 36-week course junior , mid-career officers included military aviation theory. bombardment section, under direction of chief, major harold l. george, became influential in development of doctrine , dissemination throughout air corps. 9 of instructors became known throughout air corps bomber mafia , 8 of whom (including george) went on generals during world war ii. conversely, pursuit tacticians, capt. claire chennault, chief of school s pursuit section, found influence waning because of repeated performance failures of pursuit aviation. finally, doctrine represented air corps attempt develop autonomy general staff, enforced subordination of air arm limiting support of ground forces , defense of united states territory.

technological advances in bombers

gear down test flight of boeing y1b-9 bomber in 1932. @ time faster existing pursuit plane.

new bomber types under development outperformed new pursuit types, particularly in speed , altitude, considered primary defenses against interception. in both 1932 , 1933, large-scale maneuvers found fighters unable climb altitude enough intercept attacking b-9 , b-10 prototypes, failure complete westover, following 1933 maneuvers, proposed elimination of pursuits altogether.

1933 pivotal year in advancement of aviation technology in all-metal airplane came of age, practically overnight in words of 1 historian, because of availability of first practical variable-pitch propeller. coupled best weight design of airframes, controllable pitch propeller resulted in immediate doubling of speeds , operating ranges without decreasing aircraft weights or increasing engine horsepower, exemplified civil douglas dc-1 transport , military martin b-10 bomber.

the b-10 featured innovations became standard internationally next decade: all-metal low wing monoplane, closed cockpits, rotating gun turrets, retractable landing gear, internal bomb bay, high-lift devices , full engine cowlings. b-10 proved superior 14 operational test models delivered in 1934 fed air corps mail operation, , despite glitches caused pilot unfamiliarity innovations, bright spot. first action repair damaged image of air corps involved movement of ten yb-10s bolling field alaska, ostensibly airfield survey, timed coincide release of baker board s report in july.

the successful development of b-10 , subsequent orders more 150 (including b-12 variant) continued hegemony of bomber within air corps resulted in feasibility study 35-ton 4-engined bomber (the boeing xb-15). while later found unsuitable combat because power of existing engines inadequate weight, xb-15 led design of smaller model 299, later become boeing b-17 flying fortress, first flight @ end of july 1935. time air corps had 2 projects in place development of longer-ranged bombers, project bomber ferry range of 5,000 miles (8,000 km), , project d, 1 of range of 10,000 miles (16,000 km). in june 1936 air corps requested 11 b-15s , 50 b-17s reinforcing hemispheric defense forces in hawaii, alaska, , panama. request rejected on basis there no strategic requirements aircraft of such capabilities.

general staff resistance air corps doctrine

the army , navy, both cognizant of continuing movement within air corps independence, cooperated resist it. on 11 september 1935, joint board, @ behest of navy , concurrence of macarthur, issued new joint action statement once again asserted limited role of air corps auxiliary mobile army in missions, including coastal defense. edict issued intent of again shoving upstart air corps place. however, bomber advocates interpreted language differently, concluding air corps conduct long range reconnaissance, attack approaching fleets, reinforce distant bases, , attack enemy air bases, in furtherance of mission prevent air attack on america.

a month later (15 october 1935), general staff released revision of doctrinal guide air corps, training regulation tr 440-15 employment of air forces of army. year earlier macarthur had changed tr 440-15 clarify air corps s place in scheme of national defense and ... (to away with) ... misconceptions , interbranch prejudices. general staff characterized latest revision compromise airpower advocates, mitigate public criticism of joint action statement, newest revision parroted anti-autonomy conclusions of drum , baker boards, , reasserted long-held position (and of secretary dern) auxiliary support of ground forces primary mission of air corps. tr 440-15 did acknowledge doctrinal principles asserted acts (including necessity of destroying enemy s air forces , concentrating air forces against primary objectives) , recognized future wars entail missions beyond sphere of influence of ground forces (strategic bombardment), did not attach importance prioritization of targets, weakening effectiveness doctrine. air corps in general assented changes, did other compromises of period, acceptable moment. tr 440-15 remained doctrinal position of air corps until superseded first air corps field manual, fm 1–5 employment of aviation of army, on 15 april 1940.

in fall of 1937 army war college s course on use of airpower reiterated general staff position , taught airpower of limited value when employed independently. using attaché reports both spain , ethiopia, , endorsed senior air corps instructor, col. byron q. jones, course declared flying fortress concept had died in spain , , airpower useful long range artillery. air corps officers in g-3 department of general staff pointed out jones conclusions inconsistent revised tr 440-15, views dismissed deputy chief of staff maj. gen. stanley embick comment: no doctrine sacrosanct, , of military doctrines, of air corps should last regarded.

at same time general staff ordered studies service branches develop drafts coming field manuals. air corps board, function of acts, submitted draft in september 1938 included descriptions of independent air operations, strategic air attacks, , air action against naval forces, of general staff rejected in march 1939. instead ordered opening chapter of air corps manual doctrinal statement developed g-3 left little doubt general staff s intention develop , employ aviation in support of ground forces. air corps board, on orders of arnold, developed secret study defense of monroe doctrine recommended development of long-range, high altitude, high-speed aircraft bombardment , reconnaissance accomplish defense.

the war department, seeking stifle procurement of b-17 while belatedly recognizing coordinated air-ground support had been long neglected, decided order two-engined light bombers in fiscal years 1939 through 1941. rejected further advancement of project a, development program long range bomber. in collaboration navy, joint board (whose senior member army chief of staff gen. malin craig) on 29 june 1938 issued ruling foresee no use long-range bomber in future conflict. direct result, last planned order of long-range bombers (67 b-17s) cancelled craig , moratorium on further development of them put effect restricting r&d funding medium , light bombers. policy last less year, went against not trends of technological development, against geopolitical realities of coming war. in august 1939 army s research , development program 1941 modified addition of 5 million dollars buy 5 long-range bombers experimental purposes, resulting on 10 november 1939 in request arnold of developmental program create boeing b-29 superfortress, approved on 2 december.

between 1930 , 1938 air corps had obtained mission in coastal defense justified both creation of centralized strike force , development of four-engined bombers, , on resistance of general staff lobbied mission, strategic bombardment, persuasively argue independence army. cost of general staff s resistance in terms of preparedness had been severe, however. policies had resulted in acquisition of obsolete aircraft first-line equipment, stifled design development in private sector of better types, retarded development of radar , ordnance, , handicapped training, doctrine, , offensive organization reneging on commitments acquire b-17. october 1935 until 30 june 1939, air corps requested 206 b-17 s , 11 b-15 s. yet because of cancellations , reductions of these requests war department, 14 four-engine planes delivered air force outbreak of world war ii in september 1939.

ghq air force

a major step toward creation of separate air force occurred on 1 march 1935 activation of centralized, air force-level command headed aviator answering directly army chief of staff. called general headquarters air force, organization had existed in army planning since 1924 subordinate element of army general headquarters, activated control army units in case of war mobilization. in anticipation of military intervention cuba in 1933, headquarters had been created on 1 october not staffed. drum board of 1933 had first endorsed concept, means of reintegrating air corps control general staff, in effect reining in.

among recommendations of baker board, established in wake of air mail scandal, proposals of drum board adopted: increase in strength 2,320 aircraft , establishment of ghq air force permanent peacetime tactical organization, both ameliorate pressures separate air force , exploit emerging capabilities in airpower. in absence of general headquarters (i.e. peacetime), ghq air force report general staff. war plans division of army reacted recommendations of baker board insisting men , modern equipment 7 army divisions procured before increase in air corps begun, , opposed immediate attempt bring air corps 1,800 plane-strength first authorized in 1926, fear of antagonizing navy. president roosevelt approved open-ended program increase strength 2,320 aircraft (albeit without proviso funding) in august 1934, , secretary dern approved activation of ghq air force in december 1934.

ghq air force took control of combat air units in united states jurisdiction of corps area commanders, had resided since 1920, , organized them operationally strike force of 3 wings. ghq air force remained small in comparison european air forces. on first day of existence, command consisted of 60 bombers, 42 attack aircraft, 146 pursuits, , 24 transports, amounting 40% of strength in tables of organization. administratively organized forces 4 geographical districts (which later became first 4 numbered air forces) paralleled 4 field army headquarters created in 1933.

the general staff perceived creation means of lessening air corps autonomy, not increasing it, however, , ghq air force coordinate component equal air corps, not subject control. organizations reported separately chief of staff, air corps service element of air arm, , ghqaf tactical element. ghq air force s members, along members of units stationed overseas , under control of local ground commanders, remained part of air corps. dual status , division of authority hampered development of air corps next 6 years, had air service during world war i, , not overcome until necessity of expanding force occurred onset of world war ii. commanding general of ghq air force, maj. gen. frank m. andrews, clashed philosophically westover on direction in air arm heading, adding difficulties, andrews in favor of autonomy , westover not espousing subordination army chain of command, aggressively enforcing prohibitions against commentary opposed current policy. andrews, virtue of being out westover s control, had picked mantle of radical airmen, , westover found himself on wrong side of history far future of air corps concerned.

lines of authority blurred ghq air force controlled combat flying units within continental united states. air corps responsible training, aircraft development, doctrine, , supply, while ground forces corps area commanders still controlled installations , personnel manning them. example of difficulties arrangement imposed on commanders while commander of ghq air force responsible discipline of command, had no court martial authority on personnel, retained corps area commander. base commanders of air corps installations reported many 4 different higher echelons. issue of control of bases ameliorated in 1936 when ghqaf bases exempted corps area authority on recommendation of inspector general s department, in november 1940 restored again corps area control when army general headquarters activated.

interception of rex. navigator mission 1st lt. curtis lemay.

in january 1936, air corps contracted boeing thirteen y1b-17 flying fortress prototypes, enough equip 1 squadron operational testing , thirteenth aircraft stress testing, deliveries made january august 1937. cost of aircraft disturbed secretary of war harry woodring, denied requests further purchases, although air arm embraced strategic bombing primary doctrine after creation of ghq air force, 1938 there still thirteen on hand. on 18 march 1938 secretary woodring implemented plan have included purchase of 144 four-engine bombers approval reversed in july when moratorium against long-range bomber program imposed joint board. purchase of 67 b-17s (five squadrons) in fy 1940 increment of woodring program, using carryover funds, cancelled craig.

the moratorium resulted enmity of navy incurred air corps on 12 may 1938 when publicized interception of italian ocean liner rex 3 b-17s while 610 nautical miles (1,100 km) off-shore of new york city. possibly under pressure navy, craig placed limit of 100 nautical miles (190 km) on future off-shore flights army. services issued revised joint action statement in november reasserting mission of air corps in coastal defense supporting navy if called upon so, while simultaneously authorizing navy long-range shore-based coastal patrol mission denied air corps. westover, stridently opposed cancellation of woodring program, killed in air crash on 21 september 1938 , succeeded arnold.

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